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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
Plaintiff N.R., through his parents, T.R. and E.M.R., 
brought this action against the Kingwood Township Board 
of Education ("the Board") under the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C.SS 1400-91 
(1994), requesting reimbursement for private school tuition 
and support services. N.R. claims that the Board's proposed 
placement failed to provide him with a meaningful 
educational benefit in the least restrictive environment, as 
required by the IDEA. The District Court granted summary 
judgment in favor of the Board. 
 
We affirm the District Court's holding that the Kingwood 
placement provided N.R. with a sufficient educational 
benefit to constitute a "free and appropriate public 
education." However, we vacate the court's holding that the 
Kingwood placement constituted the least restrictive 
environment, and we remand for a determination of 
whether the Board failed to consider any appropriate, state- 
qualified alternate placements within a reasonable distance 
of N.R's residence. 
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I. 
 
N.R. was born on September 7, 1991, and was classified 
as preschool handicapped in 1994. During the summer of 
1996, N.R.'s parents met with Board officials to discuss an 
Individualized Education Program ("IEP") for N.R. for the 
1996-97 school year. The Board's child study team 
determined that N.R. had the skills to begin kindergarten in 
the fall of 1996 and recommended his placement in the 
Kingwood School's regular kindergarten program. On 
August 2, 1996, however, T.R. and E.M.R. rejected this 
proposed placement, stating that they planned to send N.R. 
to preschool for another year.1 
 
At that time, Kingwood Township did not offer a regular 
preschool program for non-disabled children. Rather, the 
Township offered a single, half-day preschool class 
composed of half disabled children and half non-disabled 
children. The Board drafted a new IEP which provided for 
N.R.'s placement in this class, with afternoon placement in 
the school's resource room. N.R.'s parents rejected this 
proposal and informed the Board that they planned to have 
N.R. spend the next year at the Rainbow Rascals Learning 
Center ("Rainbow Rascals"), a private daycare center that 
N.R. had attended the previous year. At the time, Rainbow 
Rascals was not accredited as a preschool by the State of 
New Jersey or by any independent educational 
accreditation agency. Nevertheless, T.R. and E.M.R. 
requested that the Board pay for N.R.'s tuition at Rainbow 
Rascals and provide supplemental special education 
services there. 
 
The Board filed for due process, seeking a determination 
that its 1996-97 IEP provided N.R. with a free appropriate 
public education in the least restrictive environment as 
required by the IDEA. The Administrative Law Judge found 
that Kingwood Township's kindergarten program satisfied 
the IDEA's requirements and that the Board should not be 
liable for the parents' decision to keep N.R. at Rainbow 
Rascals. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. N.R. would have turned five the week that school began, and New 
Jersey law does not require a parent to enroll a child in kindergarten 
until the child has reached the age of six. 
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In April 1997, N.R.'s parents filed suit on his behalf in 
District Court. They alleged, inter alia, that the ALJ had 
erred in finding that the Board's proposed IEPs had offered 
N.R. a free appropriate public education in the least 
restrictive environment. The parties filed cross-motions for 
summary judgment, and the District Court granted 
summary judgment in favor of the Board. The District 
Court found that the 1996-97 IEP (consisting of placement 
in Kingwood's half-day preschool class and resource room) 
provided N.R. with a free, appropriate public education by 
offering more than a trivial education benefit. See T.R. v. 
Kingwood Township Bd. of Educ., 32 F. Supp. 2d 720, 728- 
29 (D.N.J. 1998). The court pointed to testimony by the 
Board's expert witnesses, Dr. Frances Hobbie and Dr. Leslie 
Callanan, who stated that the Kingwood program would 
meet N.R.'s educational needs. The court also referenced 
the testimony of Darlene Johnson, the teacher of the 
Kingwood preschool class, who stated that she was familiar 
with N.R.'s IEP and would work to implement it on a daily 
basis. 
 
In addition, the District Court found that the Kingwood 
class constituted the least restrictive environment for N.R. 
under the IDEA. See id. at 730. Finally, the court held that 
Rainbow Rascals could not be considered as a possible 
placement for N.R. because it was not accredited by the 
state. See id. at 730-31. 
 
N.R. and his parents appeal, seeking reimbursement for 
N.R.'s tuition at Rainbow Rascals and for his therapy costs 
for the 1996-97 school year. 
 
We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 20 U.S.C. 
S 1415(i)(2). We exercise plenary review of the legal 
standard applied by the District Court. See Polk v. Central 
Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171, 181 (3d 
Cir. 1988). However, we must accept the District Court's 
findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. See Oberti 
v. Board of Educ. of Borough of Clementon Sch. Dist. , 995 
F.2d 1204, 1220 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 
II. 
 
The IDEA requires states receiving federal funding under 
the Act to have "in effect a policy that ensures all children 
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with disabilities the right to a free appropriate public 
education." 20 U.S.C. S1412(1). Where a state fails to 
satisfy this statutory mandate, parents have a right to 
reimbursement for private school tuition. See Burlington v. 
Department of Educ. of Commonwealth of Mass., 471 U.S. 
359, 370 (1985). Appellants argue that the District Court 
erred in finding that the Board's 1996-97 IEP provided N.R. 
with a free appropriate public education because the Court 
applied an incorrect legal standard and failed to conduct an 
independent review of the record. We reject this argument. 
Although it appears that the District Court did apply an 
incorrect legal standard, it is also apparent that the Board 
introduced more than sufficient evidence to prove, under 
the proper standard, that the Kingwood preschool 
placement provided a free and appropriate education 
(hereinafter "FAPE") for N.R. 
 
The Supreme Court has construed the statute's FAPE 
mandate to require "education specially designed to meet 
the unique needs of the handicapped child, supported by 
such services as are necessary to permit the child`to 
benefit' from the instruction." Hendrick Hudson Dist. Bd. of 
Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 188-89 (1982). The 
education provided must "be sufficient to confer some 
educational benefit upon the handicapped child," id. at 
200, although the state is not required to "maximize the 
potential of handicapped children." Id. at 197 n.21. Prior to 
the District Court's decision in this case, our Court 
interpreted Rowley to require that an IEP offer "more than 
a trivial or de minimis educational benefit." Oberti, 995 
F.2d at 1213; see also Polk, 853 F.2d at 179 (IDEA "calls 
for more than a trivial educational benefit"). Specifically, we 
said that a satisfactory IEP must provide "significant 
learning" and confer "meaningful benefit." Polk, 853 F.2d at 
182, 184. 
 
The District Court, in apparent reliance on these 
precedents, focused its review on "whether [N.R.'s] IEP was 
sufficient to confer an educational, nontrivial benefit on 
him," and concluded that it was. T.R., 32 F. Supp. 2d at 
728. However, in our most recent explication of the FAPE 
standard, our Court squarely held that "[t]he provision of 
merely `more than a trivial educational benefit' does not 
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meet" the meaningful benefit requirement of Polk. 
Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. N.E., 172 F.3d 238, 247 (3d Cir. 
1999). By failing to inquire into whether the Board's IEP 
would confer a meaningful educational benefit on N.R., the 
District Court applied the incorrect legal standard on this 
issue.2 
 
Nevertheless, we believe that the evidence on which the 
District Court relied amply satisfies the somewhat more 
stringent "meaningful benefit" test. As the District Court 
noted, both Dr. Callanan and Dr. Hobbie testified to the 
benefits N.R. would receive from resource-room work in the 
areas of communication and motor skills. (App. 32, 45.) Dr. 
Hobbie also noted the educational advantages of the 
Kingwood preschool program, including small class size, a 
full-time aide, and the presence of supplemental staff and 
a child study team on premises. (App. 38-39.) Darlene 
Johnson, the teacher of the Kingwood preschool class, 
testified that she would implement N.R.'s IEP on a daily 
basis in her class. (App. 34-35.) The District Court's 
decision to credit this testimony is a finding of fact and is 
entitled to deference in the absence of clear error. See 
Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1220. In light of this credible evidence, 
we believe that the Board satisfied its burden to show that 
N.R. would receive a meaningful educational benefit from 
the Kingwood preschool program. 
 
Appellants also argue that the District Court failed to give 
adequate consideration to N.R.'s individual potential in 
concluding that the Kingwood IEP was appropriate. In 
Ridgewood, this Court reiterated that the educational 
benefit of an IEP "must be gauged in relation to a child's 
potential." 172 F.3d at 247 (quoting Polk, 853 F.2d at 185). 
To fulfill this mandate a district court must"analyze the 
type and amount of learning" of which the student is 
capable. Ridgewood, 172 F.2d at 248. 
 
Contrary to appellants' suggestion, the District Court did 
address N.R.'s specific needs in its analysis. The Court 
noted that "Dr. Frances Hobbie stated that the[Kingwood] 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Although the District Court did cite to Polk, it explicitly--and 
erroneously--applied a "more than trivial benefit" standard. See T.R., 32 
F. Supp. 2d at 728. 
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preschool program would . . . suit N.R.'s needs," and the 
Court cited to the portion of Dr. Hobbie's testimony that 
specifically discussed those needs. T.R., 32 F. Supp. 2d at 
728. For example, Dr. Hobbie discussed the specific 
benefits that N.R. could obtain from resource room work: 
 
       I like some individual attention to the areas of need. 
       . . . I would definitely think that it would be 
       tremendously beneficial for [N.R.] to have some speech 
       language therapy individually . . . certainly in the 
       resource center I would like to see him get some really 
       individual work on speech language. 
 
       As far as the motor component where he has some 
       difficulty, that again could be worked on in that special 
       program. 
 
(App. 45.) 
 
The District Court also cited Dr. Callanan's testimony, in 
which she further addressed N.R.'s specific needs and 
capabilities. See T.R., 32 F. Supp. 2d at 729. Dr. Callanan 
opined that "N.R.'s particular difficulties" did not 
necessitate a full-day preschool program. (App. 8.) She 
noted that N.R.'s participation in lunch and recess in the 
Kingwood program would provide "additional time for 
socialization." (App. 8.) She further testified that N.R. would 
benefit from time in the resource center at Kingwood 
because of "his need for additional time to rehearse skills" 
(App. 20) and noted that "N.R.'s motoric [sic] difficulties and 
his communication difficulties could be greatly benefitted 
by resource center placement." (App. 32.) This testimony-- 
which was referenced by the District Court in support of its 
holding--explicitly assessed the Kingwood IEP in light of 
N.R.'s individual needs and potential. 
 
In sum, the District Court's failure to enunciate the 
correct "meaningful benefit" test is not fatal to its 
determination that the 1996-97 IEP offered N.R. a free 
appropriate public education. Even under the proper 
standard, the evidence in the record is more than sufficient 
to support a finding that the Kingwood program would 
confer on N.R. a meaningful educational benefit in light of 
his individual needs and potential. 
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III. 
 
A. 
 
The IDEA also contains a "mainstreaming" component, 
which requires states to establish "procedures to assure 
that, to the maximum extent appropriate, handicapped 
children . . . are educated with children who are not 
handicapped." 20 U.S.C. S 1412(5)(B) (1994).3 We have 
interpreted this mandate to require that a disabled child be 
placed in the least restrictive environment (hereinafter 
"LRE") that will provide him with a meaningful educational 
benefit. "The least restrictive environment is the one that, 
to the greatest extent possible, satisfactorily educates 
disabled children together with children who are not 
disabled, in the same school the disabled child would 
attend if the child were not disabled." Carlisle Area Sch. v. 
Scott P., 62 F.3d 520, 535 (3d Cir. 1995). Appellants 
contend that the District Court erred in finding that the 
Kingwood preschool program was the LRE for N.R. We 
agree with the appellants that the Court failed adequately 
to investigate potential alternative placements, and we 
remand for consideration of this issue. 
 
In Oberti, this Court adopted a two-part test for assessing 
compliance with the LRE requirement. First, the Court 
must determine "whether education in the regular 
classroom, with the use of supplementary aids and 
services, can be achieved satisfactorily." Oberti, 995 F.2d at 
1215. Factors the Court should consider in applying this 
prong are: (1) the steps the school district has taken to 
accommodate the child in a regular classroom; (2) the 
child's ability to receive an educational benefit from regular 
education; and (3) the effect the disabled child's presence 
has on the regular classroom. See id. at 1215-17. Second, 
if the Court finds that placement outside of a regular 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. In 1997, Congress amended the IDEA, recodifying the definition of 
least restrictive environment at 20 U.S.C. S 1412(a)(5)(A) (1998 Supp.) 
and adding a new provision that requires that state special education 
funding formulas not result in restrictive or segregated placements, see 
20 U.S.C. S 1412(a)(5)(B) (1998 Supp.). Because the Kingwood IEP was 
formulated prior to 1997, the amendments do not apply in this case. 
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classroom is necessary for the child's educational benefit, it 
must evaluate "whether the school has mainstreamed the 
child to the maximum extent appropriate, i.e., whether the 
school has made efforts to include the child in school 
programs with nondisabled children whenever possible." Id. 
at 1215. These requirements apply to preschool children, 
see 34 C.F.R. S 300.552, and the Board bears the burden 
of proving compliance with the IDEA's mainstreaming 
requirement. See Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1215. 
 
B. 
 
The peculiar facts of this case make a mechanical 
application of the Oberti test difficult. As the District Court 
correctly noted, the Kingwood preschool program"cannot 
be described as a typical `regular class,' nor is it a typical 
special education class; half of the children in the class are 
handicapped, and any preschool child living in Kingwood 
Township may apply to attend the program." T.R., 32 F. 
Supp. 2d at 730. Nevertheless, it is clear that the Kingwood 
preschool class is, under the terms of the IDEA, more 
restrictive than a "regular," fully-mainstreamed preschool 
class would be. Indeed, the Kingwood program's statement 
of philosophy states that it "has been designed to meet the 
needs of Kingwood Township students ages three through 
five who have an identified disabling condition or a 
measurable developmental impairment and who would 
benefit from special education." (App. 100) (emphasis 
added). 
 
Certainly, the IDEA does not contemplate "an all-or- 
nothing educational system in which handicapped children 
attend either regular or special education." Oberti, 995 F.2d 
1204, 1218 (quoting Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 
F.2d 1036, 1050 (5th Cir. 1989)). However, we believe that, 
under the IDEA's strict mainstreaming requirement, a 
hybrid preschool program like Kingwood's would ordinarily 
provide the LRE only under two circumstances: first, where 
education in a regular classroom (with the use of 
supplementary aids and services) could not be achieved 
satisfactorily or, second, where a regular classroom is not 
available within a reasonable commuting distance of the 
child. 
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The record contains no indication that N.R. could not 
have been educated satisfactorily in a regular classroom. 
Indeed, the Board's own experts admit that N.R.'s 
placement in Kingwood's regular kindergarten class (which 
was rejected by the parents) would be fully appropriate. 
(App. 31-32, 40-41, 46-47, 50-51.) Based on this 
undisputed testimony, it seems clear that N.R. could have 
received a meaningful educational benefit from a regular 
classroom. Moreover, there is no contention that his 
behavior would have been disruptive to other students. 
 
Of course, a district that does not operate a regular 
preschool program is not required to initiate one simply in 
order to create an LRE opportunity for a disabled child. See 
34 C.F.R. S 300.552, Note (1996). However, the school 
district is required to take into account a continuum of 
possible alternative placement options when formulating an 
IEP, including "[p]lacing children with disabilities in private 
school programs for nondisabled preschool children." Id. 
Under these circumstances, the District Court erred in not 
inquiring into whether regular classroom options were 
available within a reasonable distance to implement N.R.'s 
IEP, and we remand so the District Court may consider this 
question. 
 
C. 
 
We next address the appellants' contention that the 
Board and the District Court erred specifically in failing to 
include Rainbow Rascals in the continuum of available 
programs. Appellants claim that Rainbow Rascals would 
have provided N.R. with a free and appropriate public 
education in the least restrictive environment and that the 
state's placement of N.R. in the Kingwood preschool 
program, rather than in Rainbow Rascals, was in error. 
 
As a substantive matter, it seems likely that the Rainbow 
Rascals program, aside from its lack of accreditation, could 
have provided N.R. with an FAPE. For example, the Board's 
experts admitted that N.R. had made substantial gains 
during his 1995-96 placement at Rainbow Rascals. (App. 
25, 48.) In addition, Rainbow Rascals' classroom was fully 
mainstreamed and thus less restrictive under the IDEA 
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than the Kingwood preschool program. Therefore, unless 
the state was barred from considering Rainbow Rascals on 
its continuum of alternative placements for some other 
reason, the Board would have been required to approve the 
Rainbow Rascals placement as the one providing an FAPE 
in the LRE. 
 
Nevertheless, we agree with the District Court's 
conclusion that the Board was not required to consider 
placement in Rainbow Rascals because that program was 
not properly accredited under New Jersey law. Under 20 
U.S.C. S 1401(a)(18)(D), the "free and appropriate public 
education" required under IDEA must "meet the standards 
of the State educational agency." Although federal 
regulations envision placing disabled children in"regular" 
private school classes, the universe of private programs 
that a state may consider is at least partly defined by state 
law. 
 
Under the state regulations in place at the time the 1996- 
97 IEP was formulated, New Jersey's program options for 
IDEA placement included "[a]n approved private school for 
the handicapped," and "[a]n accredited nonpublic school 
which is not specifically approved for the education of 
children with educational disabilities." N.J.A.C.S 6:28-4.2 
(1997).4 The regulations defined an "approved private school 
for the handicapped" as "an incorporated entity approved 
by the Department of Education . . . to provide special 
education and related services to pupils with educational 
disabilities." N.J.A.C. S 6:28-1.3 (1997). It is undisputed 
that Rainbow Rascals lacked such approval. 
 
The regulations also permitted placement in a non- 
approved, accredited private school "with the consent of the 
Commissioner [of Education] or by an order of a court of 
competent jurisdiction." N.J.A.C. S 6:28-6.5(a) (1997). 
Accreditation under this regulation required "the on-going, 
on-site evaluation of a nonpublic school by a governmental 
or independent educational accreditation agency which is 
based upon written evaluation criteria that address 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The sections of the New Jersey Administrative Code dealing with 
special education were repealed and recodified as amended in 1998. 
However, the pre-amendment regulations govern this case. 
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educational programs and services, school facilities and 
school staff." N.J.A.C. S 6:28-6.5(b)(1) (1997). Rainbow 
Rascals was not accredited as a preschool by any state or 
independent agency at the time the IEP was formulated, 
and there is no showing that its personnel possessed the 
professional certifications and licenses required by N.J.A.C. 
S 6:28-6.5(b)(5). Indeed, Rainbow Rascals' only license at 
the time was as a daycare center. (App. 119.) Accordingly, 
it was not eligible for placement under this regulation, even 
with the consent of the state Department of Education.5 
 
Because Rainbow Rascals was neither approved nor 
accredited as a preschool under New Jersey law, it was 
ineligible for placement consideration by the state under 
S 1401(a)(18)(D).6 Accordingly, the Board did not err by 
failing to consider it when preparing N.R.'s IEP. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The special education regulations in force in 1996 did contain what 
was apparently a general waiver provision, which provided that 
"[e]xceptions to the requirements of this chapter shall be [m]ade only 
with prior written approval of the Department of Education through its 
county office . . . for a period not to exceed one year." N.J.A.C. S 
6:28-4.6 
(1997). Nevertheless, we do not believe that the IDEA required New 
Jersey to make an exception for an unaccredited, unapproved program 
like Rainbow Rascals. Requiring a state to ignore its substantive 
educational standards by forcing it to make an exception whenever a 
non-qualifying school provides a somewhat less restrictive environment 
than an approved school (which also offers the student an FAPE) would 
effectively replace state standards with the federal courts' case-by-case 
determinations of educational appropriateness. Such a reading would 
render S 1401(a)(18)(D) a virtual nullity. As the Supreme Court 
emphasized in Rowley, the IDEA was not intended to "displace the 
primacy of states in the field of education" but rather "to assist them in 
extending their educational systems to the handicapped." 458 U.S. at 
208. 
 
6. The dissent suggests that New Jersey's accreditation requirement was 
a mere formality, unconnected to any substantive criteria. This is 
untrue. The accreditation regulations in effect at the time required, 
inter 
 
alia, that there be ongoing, on-site evaluation of the school by a 
government or independent accreditation agency based on written 
evaluation criteria, see N.J.A.C. S 6:28-6.5(b)(1) (1997); that personnel 
providing educational or related services hold appropriate educational 
certifications, see N.J.A.C. S 6:28-6.5(b)(5) (1997); and that the pupil 
receive a program comparable to that required to be provided by the 
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D. 
 
Finally, appellants contend that, even if Rainbow Rascals 
was not an available option for state placement, they are 
nevertheless entitled for reimbursement for their own 
unilateral placement under Florence County School District 
Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7 (1993). In Florence, the school 
district proposed a placement which the court found failed 
to provide the child with an FAPE. The parents rejected the 
placement, and enrolled the child in a private program 
which was not on the state's "approved list," but which did 
provide a substantive FAPE. The Supreme Court held that 
the parents were entitled to reimbursement even though 
the school lacked state approval, because the state 
standards requirement of 20 U.S.C. S 1401(a)(18)(D) applies 
only to placements made by a public authority. See id. at 
13-14; see also Warren G. v. Cumberland County Sch. Dist., 
190 F.3d 80 (1999). 
 
Florence does not require reimbursement for appellants' 
Rainbow Rascals placement. Both Florence and Warren G. 
involved disputes over the FAPE requirement. They did not 
address the situation we face in this case, where both the 
state-chosen (accredited) school and the parent-chosen 
(unaccredited) school would provide an FAPE, but where 
the unaccredited school would arguably provide a less 
restrictive environment. Extending Florence to these 
circumstances would require a state to ensure the 
maximally optimal LRE placement for each child, even if 
such a placement is not available in any qualifying school 
within a reasonable distance. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
public schools under the relevant statutes and regulations, see N.J.A.C. 
S 6:28-6.5(b)(6) (1997). There is no record evidence that Rainbow Rascals 
met any of these substantive criteria. Moreover, the dissent's contention 
that "the State at the relevant point in time was not accrediting private 
preschools" is without basis in the record. Even if the state had imposed 
some sort of accreditation moratorium, Rainbow Rascals would still have 
been free to qualify for IDEA placement by obtaining accreditation from 
a private agency--as it in fact did the following year. In short, there is 
no evidence that New Jersey's accreditation and approval standards were 
being used systematically to avoid the state's affirmative obligations 
under the IDEA. 
 
                                13 
 
 
Florence's own language forecloses such an 
 537<!>interpretation. Florence gives parents the right to 
 
reimbursement for a unilateral placement in a non- 
qualifying school only "if a federal court concludes both 
that the public placement violated IDEA and that the private 
school placement was proper under the Act." Florence, 510 
U.S. at 15 (emphasis added). By its terms, this is a two- 
pronged inquiry. The threshold question here focuses on 
the first prong--viz., whether the Board's proposed 
placement violated the IDEA by failing to consider Rainbow 
Rascals. The parental reimbursement mandate comes into 
play only if we answer yes to this initial question. 
 
Florence, while holding that parents are not bound by 
S 1401(a)(18)(B)'s state standards requirement, did not 
suggest that the state is required--or even permitted--to 
overlook that statutory mandate and consider placements 
that do not meet its substantive educational standards. 
Such a reading would go against the plain language of the 
statute and render the state standards requirement of 
S 1401(a)(18)(D) a nullity. Because we have found that the 
Board did not err in rejecting Rainbow Rascals as a 
potential placement, we cannot find that the "public 
placement violated IDEA" on these grounds. Of course, if 
the District Court on remand finds that the Board 
improperly failed to consider other potential placements 
that met New Jersey's substantive standards (see  part 
III(B), supra), the state may have failed to meet its 
obligations under the IDEA and reimbursement for the 
Rainbow Rascals placement may be available under 
Florence. 
 
IV. 
 
We affirm the holding of the District Court that the 1996- 
97 Kingwood IEP provided N.R. with an FAPE. We vacate 
the District Court's holding that the Kingwood placement 
constituted the least restrictive environment, and remand 
for additional proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
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STAPLETON, Circuit Judge, Dissenting: 
 
The Court concludes that, although "public agencies that 
do not operate programs for non-disabled preschool 
children are not required to initiate such programs," the 
federal regulations do impose upon them an affirmative 
duty to make all reasonable efforts to find alternatives that 
will provide the LRE. 34 C.F.R. S 300.552 Note (1987); see 
also 34 C.F.R. S 300.551. This includes the alternative of 
"[p]lacing children with disabilities in private school 
programs for non-disabled preschool children." 34 C.F.R. 
S 300.552 Note. I agree. 
 
The Court also concludes, quite properly, that Rainbow 
Rascals was available to provide N.R. with a free and 
appropriate public education in a wholly integrated 
environment. It nevertheless relieves the Board of 
Education of any duty to provide N.R. access to that 
education because Rainbow Rascals was not "accredited or 
approved" under the applicable state regulation at the time 
the placement decision was made. I would have no quarrel 
with this holding if the record indicated that Rainbow 
Rascals failed to meet educational criteria established by 
the State. See 20 U.S.C. S 1401(a)(18)(D) (the FRAP required 
under IDEA must "meet the standards of the State 
educational agency."). The record in this case, however, 
does not suggest there are any such criteria that Rainbow 
Rascals failed to meet. What the record does affirmatively 
establish is that the State at the relevant point in time was 
not accrediting private preschools, and that although state 
law provided for a waiver of the "accredited or approved" 
requirement, see N.J. Admin. Code S 6:28-4.6 (Supp. 1994), 
no request for a waiver was made.1 If a state can so easily 
avoid its affirmative duty to provide a free and appropriate 
public education in the least restrictive environment, the 
promise of the IDEA will be illusory for many. For that 
reason, I respectfully dissent. I would reverse and remand 
with instructions to grant tuition reimbursement. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. In addition to placement in accredited private schools, state law also 
authorized placement in preschools "in approved facilities." N.J. Admin. 
Code S 6:28-1.1(e)(3) (Supp. 1994). The record does not reflect, however, 
that the State maintained any list of preschools in"approved facilities." 
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